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In the Sttpreme Cottrt of the
State of Utah

BERT E. HARRIS,
)\
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
VIRGINIA WILSTEAD,
Defendant and Respondent.

\

~)

Case
No. 7182

I

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
Since the plaintiff appeals upon the judgment roll only,
and the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, findings of fact,
and conclusions of law to support the judgment are before
this Court on this appeal, we deem it wise to state fully the
allegations of the pleadings and the issues drawn thereunder.
The complaint sets forth the check and alleges that
defendant made and delivered same to plaintiff for a "valuable consideration"; that it was endorsed by plaintiff, pre-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
sented to the Bank for payment; that the Bank refused payment for the reason that defendant had stopped payment
thereon; that plaintiff is the owner and holder of the check,
no part of which has been paid, and prays for the recovery
of $4,000,00, together with interest.
The defendant in her answer admits the execution of
the check, but denies its delivery and that it was given for
a "valuable consideration." In her further answer and defense the defendant alleges that there were "negotiations"
between the parties for the sale of the real property situated at 394 North Third West in Provo on June 27, 1947;
that an oral understanding was then reached by them concerning the sale of his premises; that pursuant to same defendant was to give her $4,000.00 check, payable to plaintiff, as part payment, and plaintiff was to hold same until
July 1, 1947; that meanwhile plaintiff was to use the check
for the purpose of exhibiting it to some Idaho people to assure them that he could finance a deal for other property
there as soon as he closed the deal on his Provo property;
that plaintiff further agreed to furnish title evidence on the
Provo property for defendant's examination, and procure
a statement of the mortgage indebtedness thereon from
Provo Building and Loan Society; and that the check was
made and delivered to plaintiff pursuant to this oral understanding. The defendant further alleges that after the
said oral agreement was made, on the same day and after
banking hours, the plaintiff violated same by attempting
to negotiate the check; and that defendant, for her own protection, stopped payment on the check the following day.
Defendant further alleges that plaintiff failed to perform
his said oral agreement, and that there has been and there
is a complete failure of consideration. No demurrer was
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ever filed by plaintiff to defendant's answer, and its sufficiency was not questioned until after the trial.
Upon these pleadings the issues drawn were two-fold:
(1) Was the delivery of the check conditional within the
meaning of 61-1-17, U. C. A., 1943, and (2) Was there a
failure of consideration, or any consideration at all, for the
check in suit? If the delivery of the check was conditional and the condition broken, then it follows that the
instrument never took effect, and was effectively revoked
by defendant's stop order. Also, it should be noted that
if the contemplated contract of sale was never entered into
between the parties, then the only possible consideration of
the check failed.
After trial of these issues the lower court took the matter under advisement and counsel for the parties submitted
briefs in support of their respective positions. While the
case thus sub~tted was under advisement, plaintiff filed
a "Motion for Judgment," which was denied, and he here
assails that action as error. The plaintiff also attacks the
findings of the lower court in that (1) The Court refused
to make findings which plaintiff contends were material
and should have been made, (2) That the Court made findings which plaintiff contends were erroneous, and (3) That
the Court made findings outside the issues upon which
plaintiff contends the judgment was based.
THE ARGUMENT
The appeal is upon the judgment roll only. No Bill of
Exceptions was filed, and the evidence is not before this
Court. The only concern of this Court on this appeal,
therefore, is the inquiry whether the pleadings, findings of
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fact, and conclusions of law support the judgment. Gray
v. Defa 103 U\. 339, 135 P2d, 251; Sandall v. Hoskins, 104
U. 50, 137 P2d. 819. And in the absence of a Bill of Exceptions, the presumption is that the Court's findings are
in strict conformity with the evidence produced at the trial.
Henroid v. East Tintic Development Co., 52 U. 245, 173 P.
134.
In the light of the foregoing rules of law, it is interesting to note that counsel at the conclusion of their brief
seem to ask this Court for judgment on the pleadings. All
of their assignments of error require a review and consideration of the evidence which is not before this Court. We
shall, nevertheless, discuss our position relative to this appeal in the same order as the assignments are set forth in
plaintiff's brief.
1. THE COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT.
Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in overruling
his Motion for Judgment, and grounds his position upon the
proposition that the answer does not plead facts sufficient
to constitute a defense to the plaintiff's complaint, and that
same is insufficient in law to constitute a want or failure
of consideration. He argues that because of these contentions, the pleadings, findings and conclusions are insifficient
to sustain judgment.
At the outset, attention is called to the fact that no
contract for the sale of the plaintiff's home was pleaded.
The plaintiff sued on the $4,000.00 check. Defendant's
answer alleges that the check was never delivered for the
purpose of becoming effective until certain conditions alleged in the answer were complied with, and that upon the
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conditions being broken, no contract for the sale of the
home ever came into existence, and therefore that the consideration failed. We have set forth in some detail allegations of the defendant's further answer in the above statement of the pleadings. We believe that these allegations of
the answer are sufficient and definitely raise the issues of
"delivery" and "consideration," as above indicated.
The law on the matter of conditional delivery is clearly
set forth in Section 61-1-17, U. C. A., 1943, as follows:
"Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties, .
. the delivery in order to be effectual must be made by or under the authority of the party . . . . drawing, etc., as the
case may be; and in such case the delivery may be
shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the
property in the instrument .
"
Also, Section 61-1-25 provides that every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration. It is then provided by Section 611-29, as follows:
"Absence or failure of consideration is matter of
defense as against any person not a holder in due
course, and partial failure of consideration is a defense
pro tanto, whether the failure is an ascertained and
liquidated amount or otherwise."
It has been held by our Supreme Court that conditional
delivery may be pleaded and that the parole evidence rule
does not preclude its being proved. Martineau v. Hanson,
47 U. 544, 155 P. 432.
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Under 61-1-25 the production of the check by plaintiff
and proof of the signature make a prima facia case for a
valuable consideration; this places the burden on the defendant of producing evidence to overcome such prima facie case; but when defendant produces such evidence, the
burden is then on plaintiff to show by fair preponderance
of all the evidence a legal and valuable consideration. Hudson v. Moon, 42 U. 377, 130 P. 774.
Under 61-1-29, in an action by the payee of the check,
want or failure of consideration may be shown if presented in averments contained in the answer by showing any
arrangements entered into by the parties that is not illegal
or unreasonable. Smith v. Brown, 50 U. 27, 165 P. 468.
Pursuant to the foregoing law, the plaintiff introduced
a check, offered evidence of defendant's signature and rested. The presumption of consideration was indulged.
Thereupon defendant, pursuant to her pleading, went forward and offered evidence that the check was conditionally
delivered to plaintiff for the above mentioned special purpose, that it was to become effective as "part payment" on
the home when the deal was finally consummated, that the
conditions of the delivery were violated by the plaintiff,
that the check was therefore revoked by the stop order,
and that the agreement for the sale of the home never came
into being. Under HIUdson v Moon, supra, the burden then
shifted back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of all the evidence the oral arrangements of June 27, 1947,
in fact amounted to a valid and binding contract for the
sale of the home in order to establish consideration.
Our position is that if the check is supported by any
consideration at all, it must be the same consideration that
supported the alleged contract for the sale of the home.
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If the contract failed, the consideration for the check failed

also. The consideration for the check is not, as counsel
seemed to suggest in their brief, the agreement of plaintiff
to hold same until July 1, 1947. That agreement, together
with the promise to make use of the check in exhibiting
same to give assurance to the Idaho purchasers, constituted the conditional delivery. The only possible consideration was to show a valid contract for the sale of the home.
Counsel's point that defendant's answer is insufficient
as a matter of law to establish want or failure of consideration is unsound and unsupported. Under the doctrine of
Smith v. Brown, supra, we alleged facts showing that the
check was given when the deal was yet in the negotiations
stage; that the contract could not be consummated until
July 1, 1947, that the delivery was conditional, that the
conditions were broken, that there was a revocation of the
check by the stop order, that the contract for the sale of
the home never came into being, and that the consideration
for the check failed entirely.
Attention is called to the fact that the defendant's answer does not contain the bald conclusion of law that "there
was no consideration given by plaintiff for the check," as
contended for by counsel. The allegations of defendant's
further answer, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 thereof, summarized
above, fully set forth the two defenses, to-wit: conditional
delivery and failure of consideration. And all of the said
facts are tied to and a part of the plea of failure of consideration as evidenced by the concluding phrase: "And
that there has been, as hereinabove alleged, a failure of any
and all consideration for said check, and there is no consideration for same." The case of Smith v. Brown, supra,
contained a similar situation in that both the defenses of
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conditional delivery and failure of consideration were made
by the answer. In that case, also, the contention was made
that the averments of the answer were insufficient to raise
these defenses. This Court there said:
"While the answer is somewhat inartificially
drawn and several defenses are intermingled, yet, when
the averments contained therein are considered and
are given the liberal construction required by our statute, the answer is sufficient to permit the defendant
to prove the
. facts:" Utah Rep. 31.
"Now, under the averments in the answer, it was
relevant to prove that in consideration that the defendant should manage and conduct the business of the
corporation he was not to become personally liable to
the plaintiff for the purchase price of the capital stock
issued in defendant's name, and that the plaintiff, in
order to compensate himself for the amount he had
advanced for that stock, should receive the profits until he was fully repaid the purchase price of that stock.
Such an agreement, if entered into, certainly was not
illegal nor unreasonable." Utah Rep. 33.
It should be remembered that the plaintiff filed no demurrer to the defendant's answer or otherwise attacked
same before or during the trial. Indeed, no attack was
made on the sufficiency of the answer to raise the issues
therein set forth uritil the plaintiff moved for judgment after trial and submission of the cause for decision by the
Court. The case was tried on the assumption by both
court and counsel that the defense of failure of consideration had been raised by the pleadings. After defendant had
offered evidence tending to rebut the presumption of consideration, it then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to
offer evidence to show that the check was supported by
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consideration. The only way plaintiff could do this was to
offer evidence of the oral agreement for the sale of the
home, and that he was at all times ready, able and willing
to perfom it. This, the plaintiff did at the trial. The Court
found the issue against him. Plaintiff cites two cases in
his brief in support of the contention that the answer was
insufficient to raise the issue of consideration. Both of
these cases make against the proposition plaintiff contends
for.
The first of these is Bacon v. McChrystal, 10 U;. 290.
In that case an action for money had and received was
brought by the buyer to recover $1,200.00 paid to the seller as part of the purchase price under a parol contract for
the sale and purchase of land. The entire consideration for
the land was $1,600.00. The seller did not have title to the
land sold, and buyer demanded a return of the money paid.
Failing to obtain it, he brought this action. About six
weeks afterwards the seller executed a Warranty Deed in
favor of the buyer covering the land which was embraced
in the verbal contract and offered to deliver it to the buyer, provided the buyer would pay an additional $400.00,
which the buyer refused to do. The jury found a verdict
for the buyer, and judgment was entered for him. At the
trial the court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence
received showing a parol contract for the sale of land, and
this was excepted to by the seller, and was the chief point
relied upon on the appeal. This Court in sustaining the
judgment of the lower court, said that before the seller
(the party to be charged) can recover where there is a
parol agreement for the sale of land, he must make a timely offer to perform the oral contract, and used the follo~
ing language:
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"
It is also true that the great weight of
authority is to the effect that such an action cannot
be maintained if the person who receives the money
under such contract, void by the statute, offers to fully
perform and contract on his part. In other words, if
a person selling land by a verbal contract, as in this
case, has a perfect title himself, and offers to convey
it to his vendee upon demand, the vendee cannot complain that the contract is void because the other party,
who is the one that is required to be bound by writing,
agrees to perform, and does not seek to avoid it; but
in such case, in order that the offer to perform may
be a defense to the action, the offer should be made in
apt time, and should be made by some person competent to perform."

The record, including the evidence, was apparently
before the Court in that case, and no such offer to perform
the oral contract having been tendered until nearly two
months after the suit had been commenced, and that this
was not "in apt time."
The second case upon which counsel relies in connection with this point is that of Garbarino v. Union Savings
& Loan Association, Colo. (1941) 109 P2d. 638. This was
an action wherein the seller sues the buyer on a check for
$1,000.00 drawn to the seller by the buyer and given as
part payment on an oral contract to convey land. The
complaint alleged that the check had been given by the buyer for a good and valuable consideration, payable to the
order of the seller, and upon which the buyer later stopped
payment. The answer set up several defenses, including
failure of consideration and the statute of frauds, which the
replication controverts. The evidence was conflicting and
the case was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict
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in favor of the seller. The judgment based thereon was reviewed on this appeal. The Court in its instruction to the
jury (see P. 641) states the same rule of law as that set
out above in connection with the Bacon case in the following portion of the instruction:
" . . . You are further instructed that if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the plaintiff accepted the offer of the defendant to
purchase said Detroit Apartments, and if you further
find plaintiff has at all times since the acceptance of
said offer of the defendant been ready, willing and able
to perform said agreement for the sale of said Detroit
Apartments to the (plaintiff) in accordance with the
terms of said offer of the defendant, that then you
shall find for the plaintiff."
Furthermore, the court held in this opinion that the
issue on which the case turned was that of consideration.
For if the statute of frauds rendered the oral contract void,
then the check sued on was without consideration. The
court also held that the rule operates both ways, and in
that connection used the following language. (SeeP. 642).
"Obviously here the defendant (buyer) is in the
same position, legally, as if he were seeking to recover
$1,000.00 paid on the purchase price, instead of resisting payment of the check given for such purpose."
This makes the rule here stated applicable in the situation detailed in the Bacon case.
It is clear then that the issue of failure of consideration having been raised by the answer, both by direct denial
of the allegation in plaintiff's complaint that it was given
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for a "valuable consideration," as well as in defendant's
affirmative defense that it was without consideration, the
plaintiff had the burden to prove that he was at all times
ready; able, and willing to perform the oral agreement.
This, the findings show, the plaintiff failed to do. It is true
the statute of frauds was pleaded in the Garbarino case,
but this makes no difference, because the ultimate issue
raised by such a plea is consideration. We conclude that
the answer sufficiently pleads the defense of failure of consideration, that same is reflected in the findings, and that
the judgment is supported thereby.
II. THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO MAKE THE FINDINGS OF WHICH PLAINTIFF COMPLAINED
Plaintiff contends that the Court should have made
findings on the two issues set forth in his brief. Our position is that the Court did make sufficient findings on both
the matters complained of. There are two material issues
raised by the pleadings. (1) That the check was conditionally delivered and such conditions were violated, and
(2) There was a failure of consideration for the check.
Either one of these defenses, if proved, would constitute a
complete defense to plaintiff's complaint. The Court made
findings of the ultimate facts on each of them. On the allegations in the answer concerning conditional delivery,
namely that the check was to be held until July 1, 1947,
and that same was to be used "for the purpose of exhibiting
same to some people in Idaho to assure them the plaintiff
could finance the deal for the purchase of other property
there," the Court found as follows:
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"4. That the aforesaid check was given by the
defendant to the plaintiff as part of oral negotiations
had between the parties on June 27, 1947, for the sale
by plaintiff to defendant of a certain home and premises situated at 394 North Third West in Provo, Utah;
that the oral tmderstanding had between the parties
for the sale of said premises failed and was not carried out, and the defendant feeling insecure stopped
"
payment on the said check, as aforesaid;
On the allegations in the answer concerning failure of
consideration, namely, that there was an oral contract for
the sale of the home, that an abstract of title was to be produced, and the statement of the amount due on an existing
mortgage on the premises, the Court found as follows:
"4. . . . that thereafter the plaintiff failed to ·
perform the said oral understanding on his part and
failed to tender performance or offer to perform the
said oral agreement, and said plaintiff advertised the
property for sale to others on July 4, 1947, without
tendering performance to the defendant, and since Ju-·
ly 12 said plaintiff has not been and is not now ready,
able, and willing to convey the said premises as specified in the said oral agreement; and that the consideration for the said check has completely failed, and that
there is no consideration for same."
We contend that finding numbre 4, above set forth,
supports the allegations concerning both the issues, and
they are deemed to be supported by the evidence. Much
of plaintiff's complaint about these findings go to matters
such as indefiniteness and uncertainty, and calls for nice
refinements and distinctions to be made therein. As this
Court said in Sandall v. Hoskins, supra, (See Utah Rep. p.
56):

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
"We do not think that we should be technical in requiring a court to make refined separations between
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law especially
where the basis for the so-called finding clearly appears in the findings. Findings of Fact as we have defined them mean 'ultimate facts'."
Then follows an illuminating discussion showing how
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are necessarily intermingled in reaching the ultimate finding of the
fact. It is submitted that the finding on the crucial issue
of failure of consideration is an ultimate finding of fact and
such finding that the plaintiff was never willing, ready, or
able to perform the oral contract alone amply supports the
judgment. In any event, the requested finding of details
as to this oral agreement was unnecessary to the decision
of the case, and as this Court said in Cook v. Cook (1946)
174 P2d. 434 at 437:
"It is not necessary to make findings of fact on
issues which can have no effect on the result."
Finally, this being an appeal on the judgment roll only, and no evidence is before the Court, this assignment
should not be considered. The law is stated in 8 Bancroft's
Code Practice and Remedies, Section 6707, pp. 8890 and
8891, as follows:
"Where the evidence is not made a part of the
record by bill of exceptions or substitute therefor, findings are conclusive and must be accepted as correct
. In the absence of the evidence, alleged error in failing to make certain findings,
. . . or
a contention that the findings are contrary to law or
are not supported by the evidence will not be considered."
Seealso Gray v. Defa and Sandall v. Hoskins, supra.
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III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT COMPLAINED OF
ARE NOT ERRONEOUS.
Under this general heading the plaintiff in his brief
breaks up paragraph 4 of the Court's finding by tearing
therefrom the parts of it which he numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4.
These counsel considers separately and directs his criticism
of same as though they stood alone and apart from each
other as well as the balance of the findings in the paragraph. This clearly is a violation of the basic rule concerning construction of findings. The law in this regard
is set forth in 2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies,
beginning Section 1699, pages 2180 and 2181, the pertinent
parts of which are as follows:
Section 1699. "Findings are not construed like
pleadings, nor are they given a technical construction,
and the words are not to be so strafned as to make out
a case of conflict. The rule requiring liberal construction is often announced in the cases, and it is held that
findings are sufficient if as a whole, taken together
with the pleadings and the evidence, they justify the
judgment rendered, even though they are wanting in
precision. . . . . As a general rule, findings
speak as of the date of the complaint."
Section 1700. " . . . . It is an established
rule, frequently applied, that findings of fact should
be liberally construed in support of the judgment.
Seemingly equivocal and ambiguous findings should be
so interpreted that the judgment may be sustained;
and if there is any doubt as to the category in which
a deduction by a court belongs, that is, whether it is
finding of fact or a conclusion of law, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the judgment. So, also, if the
findings admit of a construction that will support the
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judgment, that construction will be adopted rather
than a different one that would render the judgment
erroneous .
"
Section 1701. "
. Findings must not be
considered piecemeal or according to their numerical
order, but in determining their sufficiency they are to
be read as a whole and all constituent parts are construed together. While, of course, surplusage may be
rejected, some effect should ordinarily be given to each
part of a finding, and, as thus considered, if the find~
ings can be made to harmonize with each other and
the judgment, a reversal may not be had, even though
portions of the findings when considered by themselves
are apparently confusing and inconsistent with the
"
remainder.
See cases cited in notes sustaining the foregoing propositions of law.
That the plaintiff asks the Court to violate the foregoing rule is demonstrable by reference to his points 1 and
2 in this connection. He rips 1 out of the context of paragraph 4 of the Court's findings "That the oral understanding had between the parties for the sale of said premises
failed and was not carried out and the defendant feeling insecure stopped payment on said check." Plaintiff then criticizes this finding for ambiguity, stating that it cannot be
ascertained therefrom "whether the failure was on the part
of the plaintiff or the defendant, or both." Then follows
point 2, "That thereafter the plaintiff failed to perform the
said oral understanding on his part and failed to tender performance or offer to perform the said oral agreement."
This sentence is also torn from the context of the same
paragraph 4 of the findings, so that plaintiff directs criticism to his point 1 that you cannot tell whose failure it was
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and in point 2 he answers the criticism by setting forth the
finding that "the plaintiff failed to perform the said oral
understanding on his part." Even construing these fragmentary findings with the pleadings where the oral understanding is set out in detail, they clearly set forth the finding of the facts without any uncertainty. But under the foregoing rules a construction of the said finding number 4 as
a whole leaves no doubt either about the oral understanding
or of the plaintiff's violation thereof, and these findings support the judgment.
The plaintiff, in his points 2 and 3, takes other fragments of the Court's finding number 4 and directs his criticism at them on the theory that they are findings outside
the jssues drawn by the pleadings. We shall discuss this
criticism under the next general heading of plaintiff's argument. In point 4 the plaintiff takes another fragment
"that the consideration for the said check has completely
failed, and that there is no consideration for same," and
asks the Court to consider it as though it stood alone. We
do not quarrel with the rule and the cases cited by plaintiff
supporting it that the conclusion of law does not sufficiently
plead the affirmative defense of consideration, but we contend here that our affirmative answer and the Court's finding number 4 alleges and finds facts constituting a valid defense of failure of consideration. vVe do contend that the
entire findings should be construed together and as a whole,
and when this is done there is no uncertainty in either the
pleadings or the findings as to what the defense is. As
stated above, the Court and cou~sel for both parties considered the defense of failure of consideration had been
raised by the pleadings and evidence was offered and received in support thereof. Indeed, the testimony upon
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which the finding was based was introduced by the plaintiff. Certainly the plaintiff cannot with good grace come
before this Court and assail a finding made on the basis of
testimony introduced by him at the trial and seek to have
the Court set it aside because as he states on page 25 of his
brief that "The testimony is not before this Court on this
appeal; consequently, the Court has no way of determining
whether or not there is any basis for the finding." There
is no error in the findings made.
IV. THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS ON MATTERS OUTSIDE OF THE ISSUES.
The plaintiff ardently contends that the part of the
findings assailed by him "That the plaintiff failed to tender
performance or offer to perform the said oral agreement";
and "that since July 12 the said plaintiff has not been and
is not now ready, able, and willing to convey the said premises as specified in the said oral agreement" are findings
"completely outside of and extraneous to the issues as presented by the pleadings in this case." In view of our analysis of the Bacon and the Garbarino cases herein, we are unable to follow the plaintiff's reasoning in this regard. As
above indicated, consideration for the check was presumed
and its introduction by plaintiff shifted the burden to us
to show that the consideration failed. We offered evidence
of the oral agreement, the conditional delivery of the check
which was violated and the consequent failure of consideration. It then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove that the check was in fact supported by consideration. Thus the issue became, did the seller, the only one
protected under the statute of frauds, tender performance
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to the defendant by showing that he was at all times ready,
willing, and able to perform the oral contract? This was
a part of the whole issue of consideration for the check
raised by the pleadings. It inhered in and was raised by the
plea of failure of consideration. It could not get out of the
issues thus drawn, and plaintiff himself first offered evidence concerning it. The Court found against the plaintiff
on that crucial part of the issue.
Plaintiff raised the same point on his motion to modify the findings in the trial court as he here makes. The
Court in its second Memorandum Decision answered the
plaintiff's contentions as follows:
"But plaintiff complains that that issue was never
presented by the pleadings. Unless pleading a failure
of consideration does so plead it, the contention is true.
Yet assuming it is not pleaded in the allegation of failure of consideration and that a finding thus in error,
such error could not prejudice the plaintiff. The issue
of valuable consideration is first interjected into the
cause in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint. It is
denied by the defendant. The issues upon which plaintiff seeks findings and as enumerated above, were alleged by the defendant, who makes no complaint that
there is no finding upon them.
"Further, the testimony upon which the finding
is based was introduced by the plaintiff himself under
examination by his own counsel. Can he claim prejudice? I think not. He was in no way misled by failure of the defendant to plead it, and neither party
asked amendment of the pleadings to conform to the
proof."
We agree with the Court in the matter, and fail to see
how the plaintiff could suffer any prejudice even though
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the matter had not been pleaded. But we contend it was
pleaded in the failure of consideration defense. The plaintiff in his brief admits that the only possible consideration
for the check was the oral agreement to convey. This being true, it was incumbent upon him to show that the oral
, agreement was an enforceable verbal contract which would
support and become consideration for the check. This is
precisely what plaintiff attempted to do, and indeed it is
the only thing that could be done by him to support the
check. The findings concerning it are clearly within the
issues raised by the pleading and such findings support the
judgment.
CONCDUSION
Having fully answered the plaintiff's brief, we submit
that the matters complained of therein are without merit,
and the pleadings, findings of fact, and conclusions of law
made by the Court herein amply sustain the judgment rendered.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE S. BALLIF
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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